1. On why one should be a terror to others and the purpose of embodying this fear.
The work here will be tentatively described not as a treatise but a meditation.
It will not be composed of arguments and neither will it be composed of fluffy reflections about love or passion. Unfortunately, we may lapse into the superfluous space of idealism. However, the work here will be a reaction to the arguments which suggests how terror is immoral, it will react in a dispassionate way: where the act of terror will be defended neither by hate, patriotism, religion, or any arbitrary whim of passion that appeals to the principle of humanity--but rather made acceptable as a possible mode of action in a world absent of sacred things. The point here is to liberate the act of terror from the notion or prejudice that says how it is irrational. In the loose sense, the work here might rationalize terror but in the strict sense, the work here is only to elucidate this possible course of action, as a particular determination in a generalized view of the world as a whole.
Of course: the ability to elicit fear is not for everybody: but in one sense, the power is available to everyone. It is not for anyone to exercise such power, and civil society is orchestrated in such a way to pacify our aggressions from the simplest form of decorum to the extreme measures of policing. The simple and rather crude way to defend the argument, on why one should want to be the terror, is because one could. However, this is crude precisely because it lacks the authority to compel one to forget other possiblities: one could do other things than making others afraid. One can make others happy. One can guide others to realize how they can be worthy of happiness. One can do nothing. One can be charitable to the poor. And so on.
This potential is in everyone, but it is not for everyone. We may presume it is for none--but we may be more prudent by saying it is useful for some for the ability to make others afraid must be made public. The authority to intimidate must be readily available to people of certain distinction: such as the military and the police. These distinctions are legitimated by a public system with the provisional and tacit end of proctecting the constituents and the whole of civil society.
In the public sense: the power to coerce others in that one can use force whether by physical or psychological action is available. It is part of the economy of civil society. The use of fear is to pacify, secure, and maintain civil life. The use of fear to the extent is one way of guarding a population.
In the private sense: we appropriate our boundaries by use of certain signs. I build a house and I set up a fence. The fence appropriates for others to see what I own. If people do not respect what I've appropriated as my property: that is if they disregard the sign which states for them to do otherwise, I can use force, no different from the police or the military in defending what is my own.
We may allow for this exception: I can make others afraid and it is purposeful for me to do so, since by embodying fear--fear, which is not a product or cause of some potential action but is primordial to that coercive action for The possibility of retaliation and counter-action is one in the same as the mood--I can defend what is mine, in the situation where others have taken something from me. This is not restricted to property, at least it shouldn't be. The appropriation cannot be limited to objects: since we may use force to defend lives and we can use this force recklessly. The reckless use of force maybe morally repugnant, but the imprudent use of such, allows us to judge the character and substance of specific persons--and thus providing the ruler which can we use to measure who would guard civil society. This is not to defend the reckless use of force and intimidation, but I only mean to show how recklessness provides a mirror to whatever depths there are in the human spirit.
Why one should be a terror to others seem to dissolve to relative reasons: either one is designated in a public position where one is required to do so, or one is a private individual caught in a situation where one has to defend what one owns from others. However, the purpose is clear enough: to embody fear is to embody a mode of retaliation that keeps potential harm in check. The relative reasons reflect the relative conditions of defending oneself--but the purpose of using fear, as a tactic against harmful action, remains purposive.
It will not be composed of arguments and neither will it be composed of fluffy reflections about love or passion. Unfortunately, we may lapse into the superfluous space of idealism. However, the work here will be a reaction to the arguments which suggests how terror is immoral, it will react in a dispassionate way: where the act of terror will be defended neither by hate, patriotism, religion, or any arbitrary whim of passion that appeals to the principle of humanity--but rather made acceptable as a possible mode of action in a world absent of sacred things. The point here is to liberate the act of terror from the notion or prejudice that says how it is irrational. In the loose sense, the work here might rationalize terror but in the strict sense, the work here is only to elucidate this possible course of action, as a particular determination in a generalized view of the world as a whole.
Of course: the ability to elicit fear is not for everybody: but in one sense, the power is available to everyone. It is not for anyone to exercise such power, and civil society is orchestrated in such a way to pacify our aggressions from the simplest form of decorum to the extreme measures of policing. The simple and rather crude way to defend the argument, on why one should want to be the terror, is because one could. However, this is crude precisely because it lacks the authority to compel one to forget other possiblities: one could do other things than making others afraid. One can make others happy. One can guide others to realize how they can be worthy of happiness. One can do nothing. One can be charitable to the poor. And so on.
This potential is in everyone, but it is not for everyone. We may presume it is for none--but we may be more prudent by saying it is useful for some for the ability to make others afraid must be made public. The authority to intimidate must be readily available to people of certain distinction: such as the military and the police. These distinctions are legitimated by a public system with the provisional and tacit end of proctecting the constituents and the whole of civil society.
In the public sense: the power to coerce others in that one can use force whether by physical or psychological action is available. It is part of the economy of civil society. The use of fear is to pacify, secure, and maintain civil life. The use of fear to the extent is one way of guarding a population.
In the private sense: we appropriate our boundaries by use of certain signs. I build a house and I set up a fence. The fence appropriates for others to see what I own. If people do not respect what I've appropriated as my property: that is if they disregard the sign which states for them to do otherwise, I can use force, no different from the police or the military in defending what is my own.
We may allow for this exception: I can make others afraid and it is purposeful for me to do so, since by embodying fear--fear, which is not a product or cause of some potential action but is primordial to that coercive action for The possibility of retaliation and counter-action is one in the same as the mood--I can defend what is mine, in the situation where others have taken something from me. This is not restricted to property, at least it shouldn't be. The appropriation cannot be limited to objects: since we may use force to defend lives and we can use this force recklessly. The reckless use of force maybe morally repugnant, but the imprudent use of such, allows us to judge the character and substance of specific persons--and thus providing the ruler which can we use to measure who would guard civil society. This is not to defend the reckless use of force and intimidation, but I only mean to show how recklessness provides a mirror to whatever depths there are in the human spirit.
Why one should be a terror to others seem to dissolve to relative reasons: either one is designated in a public position where one is required to do so, or one is a private individual caught in a situation where one has to defend what one owns from others. However, the purpose is clear enough: to embody fear is to embody a mode of retaliation that keeps potential harm in check. The relative reasons reflect the relative conditions of defending oneself--but the purpose of using fear, as a tactic against harmful action, remains purposive.
posted by weltgeist at 8:04 PM
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